Conceptual blending in thought, rhetoric, and ideology
Conclusion
The examples above show how speakers use conceptual blending to integrate concepts with different affective valences, often so that the desired course of action is seen as consistent with their audience’s value system. We have also seen how compression is used to simplify complex causal relationships, both so they can be more readily understood, and so that they can be construed with motivational “human scale” frames. Persuasive dis course in particular demonstrates the fact that our concepts have affective and motivational properties as well as abstract, inferential ones. Moreover, neither is set in stone as speakers frequently employ conceptual blending processes to reconstrue a particular action to alter its inferential, affective, sociocultural, and even spiritual significance.
Be they serious or playful, communicative acts between humans inevitably involve a balancing act between the static, shared set of idealized cultural models and the more dynamic needs of individuals faced with the realities of a social world that is considerably more complex. Because our construals of particular current events derive their social significance from the cultural models they evoke, even humorous framings serve to reinforce the status of those models as interpretive resources, and create social pressure to conform at least somewhat, and in certain restricted circumstances, to the guidelines laid out in those models.
Political jokes and cartoons can thus be seen as part of the larger social negotiation of the proper application of cultural models. By projecting prominent personalities into new contexts, cartoons promote particular construals of events and well-known people. They reinforce the availability of cultural models, and perhaps even police their use. Moreover, in exploiting the fortuitous structure that arises in blended spaces, humorous examples allow us to test the flexibility of our conceptual system, to navigate the space of possible construals, and to explore the radically different social and emotional consequences they can trigger.
However, for all their importance, the frames and cultural models evoked in discourse do not have a deterministic impact on either our behavior or our construals. People construct blends that are likely to be persuasive, given certain assumptions about how frames and cultural models affect behavior. However, the success of such efforts depends on the extent to which the individual accepts the validity of the model both in general and in its particular application. Moreover, people do not respond to each other’s rhetorical efforts reflexively, but rather agentively with attempts to reframe evoked models in ways more consistent with their own rhetorical goals (see Coulson 2001 for examples). As Shore (1996: 372) writes, “processes by which cultural models are brought to mind are activities of an active, intentional, and opportunistic intelligence, not a passive recording device.”
The difference between blends we act on and those we do not depends as much on the ontology supported by our cultural values and practices as it does on the structural correspondences between the representations in the different domains. For example, the success of rhetorical efforts to reify a blend like sowing a faith seed will depend in a complex way on the character of their appeal to social roles and previously established cultural practices as well as the extent to which the audience has internalized cultural values. While conceptual integration accounts for some of the mental operations necessary to incite action, the roots of action extend beyond the individual’s nervous system as conceptual blends are intimately intertwined with human doings. In this sense the reason of conceptual blending is indeed the slave to the “passion” of deeply felt motivational frames.
We have seen throughout how processes of conceptual blending mediate the exploitation of stable conventional mapping schemes and adapt shared cultural models to the idiosyncratic needs of individuals.