Conceptual blending in thought, rhetoric, and ideology
Abstract
Cultural models are idealized cognitive models of sociocultural phenomena. I suggest that the utility of cultural models lies in the ability of individual culture members to adapt overly simplistic models to our ever-changing social world via conceptual blending, a set of cognitive operations for combining concepts from different domains. A number of rhetorically motivated examples are analyzed to show how speakers use conceptual blending to integrate concepts with different affective valences, often so that the desired course of action is seen as consistent with their audience’s value system. Processes of conceptual blending are argued to mediate the exploitation of stable conventional mapping schemes in order to adapt shared cultural models to the idiosyncratic needs of individuals.
One key component of ideology is cultural models, or idealized cognitive models of sociocultural phenomena. While these models are widely shared by culture members and figure importantly in reasoning about social issues, they are often inaccurate representations of social reality. They tend to be oversimplified and to apply more readily to some cases than others (see Sweetser 1987). Moreover, speakers can have multiple and, indeed, often contradictory models of the same phenomenon. I suggest that the utility of cultural models lies in the ability of individual culture members to adapt those models to our ever-changing social world via conceptual blending, a set of cognitive operations for combining concepts from different domains. Because blending relies on people’s imaginative capacities, it often results in novel concepts and can be used to adapt cultural models to the rhetorical goals of individual members of the culture.
The framework of conceptual blending theory is briefly introduced, and an example of a rhetorically motivated blend is described.
Because conceptual blending theory is motivated by many of the same concerns as conceptual metaphor theory, and because the two theories share a common heritage in cognitive semantics, the relationship between these two frameworks is explored on Conceptual blending and conceptual metaphor. We highlight the interdependence of the two approaches and points to their differing emphasis on the language system versus particular language utterances. Where conceptual metaphor theory is focused on identifying and explaining systematic correspondence in language use across pairs of cognitive domains, conceptual blending theory is aimed at identifying mappings between cognitive models set up to understand particular utterances. Although the latter are considerably more diverse than entrenched mappings studied in conceptual metaphor theory, it is clear that conventional mappings provide speakers with an infrastructure to support the more dynamic and sometimes less principled mappings that underlie the meanings evoked by particular utterances.
This is especially the case in the examples on Humorous blends. I’m describing the conceptual blending employed in a number of humorous examples including cartoons and jokes. In spite of their jocular nature, the blends in such examples often deal with serious issues and play an important role in the perpetuation and negotiation of cultural models.
However, the role of conceptual blending in the propagation of cultural models is perhaps nowhere more evident than when speakers attempt to persuade one another to adopt a particular viewpoint or to convince them to act in a particular way. A number of different examples of persuasive texts and discourse are analyzed on Persuasive absurdity to reveal the spectacular blends that speakers create. The analyses amplify the point raised above that the creative elaboration and accommodation of cultural models relies heavily on conventionalized mapping and blending schemes. Moreover, they suggest that real persuasion depends on the motivational capacity of the cultural models themselves.
I will touch briefly on an issue that is deeply problematic in cognitive linguistics, as it is in all social sciences. That is the relationship between the meaning of sentences and the meaning of utterances, between the standard default meanings explored by linguists and the idiosyncratic meanings speakers derive in situated instances of language use, between public, idealized meaning of cultural models and their private meanings for individual culture members.