Schematic systems
According to Talmy the conceptual structuring system is based upon a limited number of large-scale schematic systems. These provide the basic organisation of the CR upon which the rich content meaning encoded by open-class elements can be organised and supported. The basic architecture of these schematic systems has been described in a series of highly influential papers by Leonard Talmy, which are collected in his two-volume set Toward a Cognitive Semantics (2000).
Talmy proposes that various schematic systems collaborate to structure a scene that is expressed via language. Each schematic system contributes different structural aspects of the scene, resulting in the overall delineation of the scene’s skeletal framework. There are four key schematic systems identified by Talmy: (1) the ‘Configurational System’; (2) the ‘Perspectival System’; (3) the ‘Attentional System’; and (d) the ‘Force-Dynamics System’ (see Figure 6.16). We provide a brief overview of each of these systems in turn.
The ‘Configurational System’
The ‘Configurational System’ structures the temporal and spatial properties associated with a scene, such as the division of a scene into parts and participants. Schematic systems like the ‘Configurational System’ can be further divided into schematic categories. In order to see how both the open-class and closed-class semantic systems encode configurational structure, we will consider one example of a schematic category within this system: the category degree of extension. Degree of extension relates to the degree to which matter (space) or action (time) are extended. Consider the open-class words speck, ladder and river, which exemplify this category as it relates to matter. The degree of extension of each of these is illustrated in Figure 6.17.
Lexical items like these include in their semantic specification information relating to degree of extension. For example, part of the meaning of river is schematic, relating to the degree of extension associated with rivers. The rich encyclopaedic meaning associated with the lexical item river relates to its specific properties as an entity involving water, which occupies a channel of certain dimensions, and which flows under the force of gravity from higher ground sometimes over many miles to the sea, and so on. In contrast to this rich and detailed specific meaning, its schematic meaning concerns the degree of extension associated with this entity. The schematic category ‘degree of extension’ has three values: a point, a bounded extent or an unbounded extent. Rivers are typically unbounded within the perceptual field of a human experiencer. In other words, while we may know from looking at maps that rivers have beginnings and ends and are thus bounded, our ‘real’ experience of rivers is usually that they are unbounded because we cannot see the beginning and end.
The examples in (11)–(13) relate to action rather than matter, and employ closed-class elements in order to specify the degree of extension involved. (Note that ‘NP’ stands for noun phrase; the relevant NP is bracketed.)
As these examples illustrate, some closed-class elements encode a particular degree of extension. For instance, in (11) the preposition at together with an NP that encodes a temporal point encodes a point-like degree of extension. The NP does not achieve this meaning by itself: if we substitute a different preposition, a construction containing the same NP noon can encode a bounded extent (e.g. The train arrives between noon and 1 pm). The punctual nature of the temporal experience in example (11) forms part of the conceptual structuring system and is conveyed in this example by the closed-class system. The nature of the punctual event, that is the passage of a train through a station rather than, say, the flight of a flock of birds overhead, relates to the conceptual content system.
In the example in (12), the preposition in together with an NP that encodes a bounded extent encodes a bounded degree of extension. In (13) the closed class elements keep-ing-er and-er encodes an unbounded degree of extension. Each of these closed-class constructions provides a grammatical ‘skeleton’ specialised for encoding a particular value within the schematic category ‘degree of extension’. The conceptual content system can add dramatically different content meaning to this frame (e.g. keep singing louder and louder; keep swimming faster and faster; keep getting weaker and weaker), but the schematic meaning contributed by the structuring system remains constant (in all these examples, time has an unbounded degree of extension).
The ‘Perspectival System’
In contrast to the ‘Configurational System’ which partitions a scene into actions and participants with certain properties, the ‘Perspectival System’ specifies the perspective from which one ‘views’ a scene. This system includes schematic categories that relate to the spatial or temporal perspective point from which a scene is viewed, the distance of the perspective point from the entity viewed, the change of perspective point over time and so on. To illustrate this system, we will consider one schematic category subsumed by this system, namely perspectival location (traditionally called deixis). This relates to the position of a perspective point or deictic center from which a scene is ‘viewed’. In intuitive terms, the deictic center corresponds to the ‘narrator’, from whose perspective you can imagine the scene being described. In spoken language, the ‘narrator’ is the speaker. In each of the following two examples, the perspective point from which the scene is described is different. In (14), the perspective point is located inside the room, while in (15) the perspective point is located outside the room.
Examples like these raise the following question: how do we know where the perspective point is located? After all, there does not appear to be anything in these sentences that explicitly tells us where it is. However, it is not the case that there is no explicit encoding that conveys the perspective point. It is simply that the perspective point is encoded by the grammatical or closed-class system: here, by the grammatical construction of the sentence. In example (14), the subject of the sentence is the door, which is the THEME: a passive entity whose location or state is described. In this example, open is an intransitive verb: it requires no object. In example (15), the subject of the sentence is two men, which is the AGENT: the entity that intentionally performs the action of opening the door. In this example, open is transitive (it requires an object: the door).
Why does changing the grammatical structure of the sentence, and thus the subject, affect our understanding of the perspective point? The reason is that what comes first in the sentence (the subject) corresponds to what is viewed first by the speaker/narrator, and this provides us with clues for reconstructing the perspective point. In the first clause of example (14), the initiator(s) of the action are not mentioned, so we deduce that the initiators of the action are not visible. From this we conclude that the perspective point must be inside the room. In example (15) the initiators of the event are mentioned first, so we deduce that the perspective point is exterior to the room. The way in which grammatical organisation mirrors experience is called iconicity. This features prominently in explanations offered by functional typologists (see Croft 2002), and has also influenced the cognitive semantics framework. These examples illustrate that the grammatical organisation of the sentence provides schematic information that enables us to determine where the perspective point is located.
The ‘Attentional System’
This system specifies how the speaker intends the hearer to direct his or her attention towards the entities that participate in a particular scene. For instance, this system can direct attention to just one part of a scene. By way of illustration, consider the pattern of distributing attention that is called the windowing of attention:
The examples in (16) relate to path windowing. Path windowing is a way of focusing attention on a particular subpart of a path of motion. Consider the path of motion represented in Figure 6.18, where the line between point A and point B represents the path of motion followed by a crate that falls from an air borne plane travelling over water. Point A represents the initial location of the crate, the line represents the trajectory of descent and point B represents the final location of the crate once it hits the water.
Path windowing allows language users to window (focus attention on) sub parts of the trajectory associated with the motion of an object. In principle, windowing can operate over the initial portion of the path, the medial portion or the final portion. The examples in (17) illustrate some more of the ways in which language can encode the windowing of attention. Recall from our discussion of example (5) that it is the internal complexity of the PATH image schema that enables attention to be focused on distinct subparts of the path of motion. The initial, medial and final windows therefore correspond to the SOURCE, PATH and GOAL of the image schema, respectively.
The ‘Force-Dynamics System’ Talmy argues that this system, as it is manifested in semantic structure, relates to the way in which objects are conceived relative to the exertion of force. It is worth pointing out that while the other schematic systems we have discussed so far relate primarily to information derived from visual perception, the ‘Force-Dynamics System’ derives from kinaesthesia (our bodily experience of muscular effort or motion) and somesthesia (our bodily experience of sensations such as pressure and pain). To illustrate this system and the linguistic devices that give rise to force-dynamics distinctions, consider the following examples drawn or adapted from Talmy (2000: 412).
The examples in (18) highlight a contrast in physical force. The expression in (18a) depicts a scene that is neutral with respect to force, in the sense that, while encyclopaedic knowledge tells us that something or someone must have caused the motion of the ball, the sentence does not refer to this knowledge. In contrast, the use of the keep V-ing construction in (18b) conveys a scene in which we understand that the ball’s natural tendency towards rest is overcome by some external force, perhaps the wind, which ensures that the ball remains in a state of motion. Again, the only difference between these two examples is in the grammatical constructions: specifically, the auxiliary verb be versus the quasi-auxiliary keep, together with the progressive participle V-ing. According to Talmy, FORCE forms part of the conceptual structure associated with our CR, the ‘Force-Dynamics System’, and can be encoded via closed-class elements like grammatical constructions.
The ‘Force-Dynamics System’ does not just relate to physical force, but can also relate to ‘psychological’ force. Consider example (19).
In this example, the contrast is between an AGENT’s non-action, as in (19a), and the AGENT’s resistance of the urge to act, as in (19b). In other words, the construction not VP in (19a) is, like (19a), neutral with respect to force. In contrast, the construction refrain from VPing encodes a force-dynamics conflict internal to the agent.
Finally, consider example (20), which illustrates social force.
The have (got) to VP construction in (20a) encodes a scene in which the subject’s desire not to act is overcome by an external force so that she is forced to act. Our encyclopaedic knowledge tells us that the force that obliges someone to go to the park is likely to be of a social rather than a physical nature: this construction therefore expresses obligation. The get to VP construction in (20b), on the other hand, encodes a scene in which the subject’s desire to act is unimpeded by any external inhibiting force so that she is able to act. This construction therefore expresses permission. Both scenes depict the same end result, but the grammatical constructions encode different force-dynamics of a social nature that lead to this result.
The discussion in this section has provided only the briefest introduction to a number of extremely complex schematic systems proposed by Talmy, each of which consists of a number of schematic categories. It is important to point out that the systems described here do not, in all likelihood, represent an exhaustive list of the subsystems that make up the conceptual structuring system, as Talmy himself acknowledges. However, even this brief discussion reveals that systematic patterns in language, both in the open-class and the closed-class semantic systems, represent evidence for a conceptual system that structures knowledge according to embodied experience. As this discussion indicates, Talmy’s theory requires a significant grammatical vocabulary in order to be fully understood. For this reason, we defer a more detailed investigation of this model until Part III of the book (Chapter 15), where our focus is on cognitive approaches to grammar.
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